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ABSTRACT
In Akamai Technologies v. Limelight, The Federal Circuit created a new type of
multiple actor infringement called divided infringement. The divided infringement
standard created by Akamai clashes with The Patent Act. It allows courts to increase
the scope of method patents after an infringing act occurs, and it renders the concept
of inducement of infringement unnecessary. This comment examines the evolution of
the divided infringement standard up to Akamai and Eli Lilly Company v. Teva
Parental Medicines, Inc, a case that applies the Akamai standard to a therapeutic
method patent. It ultimately concludes that the solution to multiple actor
infringement of therapeutic method patents lies in careful claim drafting or statutory
revision, rather than the divided infringement standard.
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A METHODICAL LOOK AT DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT
KATIE SILIKOWSKI*
I. INTRODUCTION
A well-known principle in patent law is “that which anticipates, if before,
infringes if after.”1 Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. creates a
new form of infringement that ignores this important tenet. The actions of multiple
entities cannot be combined to anticipate a method patent, but, according to Akamai,
infringement of a method patent can be divided between multiple entities. 2 In fact,
under the Akamai standard, infringement can be divided between multiple entities
even when there is no contract or traditional agency relationship between them. 3
Akamai’s conflict with this well-known principle is one sign that the Akamai
standard for divided infringement clashes with the Patent Act and the patent
system.
This comment will examine the concepts of divided infringement and
inducement. Part II of this comment will discuss the tort law foundations of divided
infringement and inducement. Then it will examine the evolution of divided
infringement up to Akamai and Eli Lilly Company v. Teva Parental Medicines, Inc, a
case that applies the Akamai standard to a therapeutic method patent. Part III of
this comment will analyze the effects of applying Akamai’s ends-driven solution to
divided infringement. Part IV of this comment will ultimately conclude that the
solution to multiple actor infringement should not be judicially increasing the scope
of the method patent after the infringing act occurs.

* © Katie Silikowski 2016. Candidate for Juris Doctor, The John Marshall Law School, 2017;
B.S. Chemical Engineering, University of Notre Dame, 2014. I would like to thank Shashank
Upadhye for his help and guidance on this comment. I would also like to thank Professor Maureen
B. Collins for teaching me how to be a better writer.
1 Peters v. Active Mfg., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889) (“That which infringes, if later, would
anticipate if earlier.”); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“the patent law principle ‘that which would literally infringe if later in time anticipates if
earlier’”); see generally 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.02 (2013).
2 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Akamai held that an entity can be responsible for the remaining steps of a method patent performed
by a separate entity if a certain relationship is present. Id. This finding allows the steps performed
by separate sources to be pieced together for a finding of infringement. Id. However, for a finding of
anticipation of method patent, each and every element of the method must be present in a single
reference. ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 545 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“A patent is invalid for
anticipation when the same device or method, having all of the elements and limitations contained
in the claims, is described in a single prior art reference.”)
3 Eli Lilly and Company v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., et. al., 1-10-cv-01376. A doctor can
be liable for directing or controlling the actions of the patient. Id. A company that provides storage
servers can be liable for the actions of its customers that use the servers. Akamai Techs., Inc.,
797 F.3d at 1025. Compare this to the traditional tort law relationship for agency liability. See
infra notes 23-28.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Inducement and Divided Infringement
The Patent Act recognizes two types of infringement—direct and indirect.4
Direct infringement occurs when an unauthorized person “makes, uses, sells, offers
to sell, or imports into the United States a patented invention.”5 Direct infringement
is strict liability.6 Prior to the establishment of divided infringement, the Federal
Circuit required that one entity or its agent perform each and every step of the
patented method for a finding of direct infringement. 7 Akamai set forth a new
standard for divided infringement, which allows a finding of direct infringement
without the traditional requirement that one entity perform each and every step of
the method.8
Indirect infringement refers to situations where a party does not make, use, or
sell a patented invention, but meets a degree of required culpability. 9 Inducement
falls under the category of indirect infringement. 10 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) states that
whoever “actively induces” the infringement of a patent is liable for infringement. 11
Courts have interpreted this section to require that the inducer have specific intent
to encourage infringement and knowledge that the patent is being infringed. 12 A
4 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2014) (covering direct infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (covering indirect
infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (covering indirect infringement). The Patent Act does not
specifically use the words “direct infringement” and “indirect infringement,” but these are the terms
commonly used by practitioners. 5◦CHISUM, supra note 1, §◦17.01.
5 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Roche Products also noted that direct infringement can include (1) making without selling or using,
(2) using without making or selling, or (3) selling without making or using. Roche Prods., 733 F.2d
at 861.
6 Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB
S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2011)(“[A] direct infringer’s knowledge or intent is irrelevant.”); In re
Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
7 Warner-Jenkinson Corp. v. Hilton Davis Corp., 520 U.S. 17, 117 (1997). Before the Akamai
case, the Federal Circuit held that to directly infringe a method patent a party must perform each
and every step or element of the claimed method. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d
1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Direct infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every
step or element of a claimed method or product.”); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (“For process patent or method patent claims, infringement occurs when a party
performs all of the steps of the process.”).
8 Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1022. The recent Akamai case allows direct infringement
when one party performs some steps of a method and is liable for another entity performing the
remaining steps. Id. (holding that an entity is responsible for others’ performing of method steps if
it directs or controls others’ performance or if the actors form a joint enterprise).
9 DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see generally 5◦CHISUM,
supra note 1, §◦17.01 (“Indirect infringement refers to . . . inducing or contributing to direct
infringement by other persons.”).
10 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)(2014) covers inducement of infringement, a form of indirect infringement.
The Patent Act does not directly refer to it as indirect infringement, but this is the term commonly
used by practitioners. 5◦CHISUM, supra note 1, §◦17.01.
11 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)(2014).
12 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 754; Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., 917
F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The alleged infringer must be shown, however, to have knowingly
induced infringement. It must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent to
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court will not find indirect infringement without an initial finding of direct
infringement.13
In Akamai, the Federal Circuit established the standard for divided
infringement.14 Divided infringement of a method patent occurs when one party
performs part of the method and influences another party to perform the remaining
steps.15 The test for divided infringement requires the court to evaluate whether the
latter party is generally under “direction or control” of the first.16 Divided
infringement is different from the traditional notion of direct infringement because,
in the case of divided infringement, neither party directly infringes the patent on its
own.17 Additionally, the “direction or control” standard for divided infringement
suggests some sort of culpability, whereas traditional direct infringement is strict
liability.18 Divided infringement also differs from induced infringement because
divided infringement does not require the heightened mens rea of specific intent or
any initial finding of direct infringement.19
B. Tort Law Foundations
The concept of divided infringement is rooted in common law notions of tort
liability.20 As the concept of inducement of infringement evolved, courts connected it
encourage another’s infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the acts
alleged to constitute inducement.”); DSU Med. Corp. 471 F.3d at 1304 (explaining that an inducer
must have knowledge of the patent to be liable for active inducement); Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that “proof of actual intent to
cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active
inducement.”).
13 Moba B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] finding of
inducement requires a threshold finding of direct infringement.”); Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S.
Phillips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (a party’s “failure to prove direct
infringement . . . necessarily dooms its allegations of indirect infringement”); Joy Techs., 6 F.3d at
774 (“Liability for either active inducement of infringement or for contributory infringement is
dependent upon the existence of direct infringement.”); BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1379; Lucent
Techs v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
14 Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1022 (“We will hold an entity [directly] responsible for
others’ performance of method steps in two sets of circumstances: (1) where that entity directs or
controls others’ performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise.”)
15 Id. at 1023.
16 Id.
17 See note 6. Direct infringement traditionally required one entity to perform each and every
element of the method. Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 38. Divided infringement allows steps of the method to
be combined if one party is directing or controlling the other. Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1022.
18 22 CHISUM, supra note 1, § SCG-5113.31. The divided infringement standard requires that
two entities jointly infringe the patent or that one directs or controls the other. Id. “Directing and
controlling” or a joint-agreement requires more culpability than strict liability, which can attach
when someone “did not themselves commit all the acts necessary to constitute infringement
and . . . had no way of knowing that others were acting.” In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d at 1368.
19 Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1025. Induced infringement requires specific intent and
knowledge that infringement is being induced. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Divided
infringement can be found as long as there is “direction or control.” Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at
1025.
20 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (“these doctrines of secondary
liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law”); Carbice Corp. of
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with different types of tort liability. 21 The two forms of liability most relevant to
divided infringement are joint tortfeasorship and vicarious liability. 22
Joint tortfeasorship is a form of direct liability. 23 Joint tortfeasors are liable for
the concerted action of a group of actors. 24 Joint tortfeasorship holds all persons
equally liable who actively take part in a tort or who “further it by cooperation or
request” in pursuance of “a common plan or design to commit a tortious act.”25
Vicarious liability, on the other hand, is a form of secondary liability. 26 Vicarious
liability refers to a case where one actor is liable for another actor’s tort due to “some
relation existing” between them.27 An actor can be vicariously liable regardless of the
actor’s mental state.28
C. The Development of Divided Infringement
Divided infringement is a creature of common law.29 Prior to Akamai, the
Federal Circuit held that infringement could be divided between two parties if one
party controlled or directed the other through a contractual or agency relationship.
BMC v. Paymentech applied this “control or direction” standard.30 The patent in that
case claimed a method for processing debit transactions without a personal
identification number.31 The method required multiple parties: the payee's agent, a
remote payment network, and a financial institution that issued debit cards. 32 The
Federal Circuit reiterated that a defendant must perform each and every step of a

Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (“Infringement, whether direct or
contributory, is essentially a tort, and implies invasion of some right of the patent.”).
21 Lynda J. Oswald, Simplifying Multiactor Patent Infringement Cases Through Proper
Application of Common Law Doctrine, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 19 (2014). The federal circuit has applied
a variety of formulations for divided infringement and it has evolved over time. Id.
22 Akamai
Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1022 (“We will hold an entity [directly]
responsible . . . (1) where that entity directs or controls others’ performance, and (2) where the actors
form a joint enterprise.”)
23 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 1984)
[hereinafter “PROSSER AND KEETON”]. PROSSER AND KEETON discusses how tort law can impose
either direct liability or secondary liability on a group of tortfeasors. Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 323. PROSSER AND KEETON discusses a party that “innocently and carefully” acts to
further a tortious purpose is not acting in concert with a group of tortfeasors. Id.
26 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 23. PROSSER AND KEATON discusses this type of liability in
the case of negligent acts. Id. This situation is commonly called “imputed contributory negligence”
or “respondeat superior.” Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
PROSSER AND KEATON notes that vicarious liability attaches if the actor has done
“nothing whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he possibly can to prevent it”.
Id. This liability was created to allocate the risk in losses caused by torts of employees. Id.
29 See Oswald, supra note 21, at 26 (“The courts have answered these questions by creating a
common law graft onto the statutory patent infringement liability scheme: a theory they initially
termed joint infringement but now seem to have expanded to a new category of divided
infringement.”).
30 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1380.
31 Id. at 1375.
32 Id.
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method patent to infringe it.33 However, it also held that the defendant could not
escape liability by contracting to have another party carry out some of the method’s
steps.34 The court determined that none of the relationships supported divided
infringement because there was no evidence of a contract or of the payee’s agent
directing or controlling other parties. 35 Further, the Federal Circuit warned against
expanding the concept of divided infringement so much that other types of
infringement were rendered unnecessary.36 The Federal Circuit also advised that the
problem of divided infringement could be prevented by careful claim drafting.37
The Federal Circuit applied the control or direction standard again in
Muniauction v. Thompson Corp.38 Muniauction centered on a patent claiming a
method for “original issuer auctions of financial instruments.”39 The method requires
a bidder to complete an inputting step, and the remaining steps are completed by the
auctioneer's system.40 The question before the court was whether the auctioneer’s
actions combined with its customer’s actions constituted direct infringement of the
method patent.41 The court applied the same control or direction standard as BMC.42
It held that, even though the defendant controlled access to the system and
instructed its bidders to use the system, the defendant did not directly infringe the
method patent.43 The opinion stated that the plaintiff “identified no legal theory
under which the [defendant] might be vicariously liable” for its customers.44
D. The Akamai Standard
Akamai broadened the standard for divided infringement. 45
Akamai
Technologies’ (Akamai) patent claims a method for delivering content to consumers
from a provider’s storage server.46 In accordance with this method, Akamai allows
end users of other content providers to tag their content to be redirected to Akamai’s
storage servers.47 The method covered by the patent can be performed by three

Id. at 1381.
Id.
35 Id. at 1382.
36 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381.
(“Under BMC’s proposed approach, a patentee would
rarely, if ever, need to bring a claim for indirect infringement.”)
37 Id.
38 Muniauction, Inc., 532 F.3d at 1323.
39 Id. at 1321.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1329.
42 Id. The court held that a “claim is directly infringed only if one party exercises ‘control or
direction’ over the entire process such that every step is attributable to the controlling party.” Id.
However, it cautioned that “arms-length cooperation” is not sufficient for direct infringement.
Muniauction, Inc., 532 F.3d at 1329.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1022.
46 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96-97 (D. Mass. 2009).
Akamai’s customers are Internet content providers with servers incapable of storing all the
provider’s content, especially during disasters or when traffic increases. Id.
47 Id.
33
34
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entities: the end user, the content provider, and the content service provider. 48
Limelight, the defendant, implemented a similar service, but argued that it was not
infringing Akamai’s patent because the method was divided among multiple actors.49
In an en banc rehearing, the Federal Circuit broadened the doctrine of divided
infringement and held that the Akamai patent was infringed. 50 Akamai held that an
entity can be responsible for other parties’ performance of steps of a method patent,
providing that it directed or controlled that performance, or if both parties formed a
joint enterprise.51 The opinion noted that direction or control can be found when the
infringer “conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon
performance of a step or steps of a patented method and establishes the manner or
timing of that performance.”52 The end users’ use of Limelight’s services met this
standard because the evidence supported that Limelight “condition[ed] use of the
content delivery network” and “establish[ed] the manner or timing of performance.”53
The opinion cited the welcome letters and instructions that Limelight sent to its
customers as establishing direction or control.54 The instructions were step-by-step,
and written so that the customers would only receive the services if they performed
the method detailed by the method patent.55

48 Id. To utilize the service, the content provider alters its web page links to direct to the
service providers server. Id. The end user’s browser fetches the content provider’s site. Id. Then it
uses the returned links to request the other objects on the page from the content service provider’s
servers. Id. The content delivery service provider replicates these page objects and directs the end
user’s request for an object to an appropriate server. Id.
49 Akamai Techs., Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d at 96-97.
50 Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1025.
51 Id. at 1022.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1024.
54 Id. Limelight’s form contract provides: “Customer shall be responsible for identifying via the
then current [Limelight] process all [URLs] of the Customer Content to enable such Customer
Content to be delivered by the [Limelight network].” Id.
55 Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1024.
The court describes how Limelight directed and
controlled its customers in detail:
Upon completing a deal with Limelight, Limelight sends its customer a welcome
letter instructing the customer how to use Limelight’s service. In particular, the
welcome letter tells the customer that a Technical Account Manager employed by
Limelight will lead the implementation of Limelight’s services. . . . Moreover,
Limelight provides step-by-step instructions to its customers telling them how to
integrate Limelight’s hostname into its webpages. . . . If Limelight’s customers do
not follow these precise steps, Limelight’s service will not be available.
Limelight’s Installation Guidelines give Limelight customers further information
on tagging content. . . . Lastly, the jury heard evidence that Limelight’s engineers
continuously engage with customers’ activities. Initially, Limelight’s engineers
assist with installation and perform quality assurance testing. The engineers
remain available if the customer experiences any problems.
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E. Divided Infringement for Therapeutic Methods
Divided infringement is particularly relevant when a generic company produces
a drug that is the subject of a method patent. 56 Generic drugs are copies of
brand-named drugs, produced after the original brand name drug expires. 57 Generic
companies do not foster the same client and doctor relationships that brand-name
companies do.58
They have drastically lower advertising expenditures than
pharmaceutical companies. Typically, they have lower expenditures because they
reach their customers through the substitution method. 59 The use of the substitution
method can result in the generic company not being aware of how its product is
labeled, let alone how a doctor will use it. 60
Eli Lilly applied the Akamai standard in the pharmaceutical context. 61 In Eli
Lilly, the court found that a generic drug manufacturer was liable for induced
infringement of a method performed by both doctors and patients. 62 That method
was for administering combination therapies for patients in need of
chemotherapeutic treatment.63 The court had to evaluate whether the doctor was
sufficiently directing or controlling the acts of the patients in a way that “conditioned
participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit.”64 The court determined this
standard was satisfied because the doctor would perform all but one of the method

56 Eli Lilly and Company v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., et. al., 1-10-cv-01376;
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
57 See
Food
and
Drug
Administration,
Understanding
Generic
Drugs
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Understanding
GenericDrugs/default.htm. The FDA defines generic drugs as “a drug product that is comparable to
brand/reference listed drug product in dosage form, strength, route of administration, quality and
performance characteristics, and intended use” or “copies of brand-name drugs and are the same as
those brand name drugs in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality,
performance characteristics and intended use.” Id.
58 Shashank Upadhye, There’s A Hole In My Bucket Dear Liza, Dear Liza: The 30-Year
Anniversary Of The Hatch-Waxman Act: Resolved And Unresolved Gaps And Court-Driven Policy
Gap Filling, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1308, 1360 (2014). Mr. Upadhye provides insight into how
generic companies function: “While the patient and doctor may know that the intent of the drug
prescription is to treat a patented indication, the generic drug company does not and cannot know.
In fact, it might be callous (but true) to say that the generic drug company does not care how the
patient uses its drug.” Id.
59 William H. Shrank, et al., State Generic Substitution Laws Can Lower Drug Outlays under
Medicaid,
29
HEALTH
AFF.
1383
(2010),
available
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/7/1383.long. All the states have implemented generic
substitution laws which can vary depending on the state. Id. Some require pharmacists to
substitute a generic for a branded medication and more permissive generic substitution laws
enacted in other states allow, but do not require, pharmacists to substitute generics. Id.
60 See Upadhye, supra note 58, at 1365.
Mr. Upadhye describes how this results in a
prescribing change where not every actor is aware of what happens to the drug. “A further problem
is the practical reality that a generic company’s drug labels are rarely seen by anyone in the
prescribing chain. In the distribution of a generic product, multiple bottles are packed into boxes
with the labels (usually on a printed pad of paper) thrown in.” Id. at 1365.
61 Eli Lilly and Company v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., et. al., 1-10-cv-01376.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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steps and then would instruct the patient to complete the remaining method step,
self-administering folic acid.65
III. ANALYSIS
This section applies the Akamai divided infringement standard to the facts of
Eli Lilly, and evaluates whether the standard is consistent with the Patent Act and
the patent law system. It then examines Eli Lilly under a divided infringement
standard that requires a traditional agency relationship.
A. The Eli Lilly Case
Suppose a pharmaceutical company has received approval to market a generic
form of a chemotherapy drug. The patent for the brand name version of the drug
expired, but the patentee holds a method patent for a combination therapy involving
the drug. This method patent requires that a doctor administers the chemotherapy
drug along with several other drugs, and that the patient supplements the therapy
by self-administering folic acid. The pharmaceutical company provides a label on the
drug detailing the regimen.
The patent owner sues the pharmaceutical company for inducement. The doctor
alone does not perform all of the steps of the therapeutic method. However, the
patentee argues that the doctor’s and patient’s activities can be grafted together for a
finding of direct infringement. The required mens rea can be attributed to the
pharmaceutical company by virtue of the instructions on the drug. This is the
situation in which Teva Parental Medicines found itself.66
B. Application of the Akamai Standard
Under the Akamai standard, Teva Parental Medicines is liable for inducement. 67
According to Akamai, a party directly infringes a method patent when it performs
steps of the method, and directs another party to perform the remaining steps. 68
Akamai held that a company directed and controlled its customers to complete the
remaining steps of a method patent by instructing them, in writing, to perform the
Id.
Eli Lilly and Company v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., et. al., 1-10-cv-01376. In Eli Lilly,
plaintiff Eli Lilly and Company alleged that defendant Teva Parenteral Medicine, Inc. was liable for
inducement of infringement of Eli Lilly therapeutic method because Teva Parenteral had put
instructions on its chemotherapy instructing on a method that would be performed by both doctors
and patients under the control of their doctors. Eli Lilly and Company v. Teva Parenteral
Medicines, Inc., et. al., 1-10-cv-01376 (INSD). This case in the Southern District of Indiana was
decided after the Akamai case which allowed for a finding of direct infringement when an entity
directs or controls another’s’ performance, which can include providing a set of instructions for
customers. Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1022.
67 Eli Lilly and Company v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., et. al., 1-10-cv-01376.
68 Akamai Techs., Inc. 797 F.3d at 1025.
65
66
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steps.69 Under this logic, a doctor directs or controls if the doctor tells the patient to
perform the remaining steps of a patented therapeutic method. 70
To establish inducement, Eli Lilly must also demonstrate that Teva Parental
Medicines specifically intended the patent to be infringed, and knowingly induced the
doctor to infringe it.71 The labels on the drug are sufficient to demonstrate Teva
Parental Medicine’s mens rea.72 Infringement requires specific intent, but courts
have applied a standard resembling strict liability to generic drugs with labels that
list the steps of a method patent. 73 The court can find that Teva Parental Medicines
induced the doctor to infringe the patent, even though the doctor did not perform all
of the steps of the method. Further, it does not even have to scrutinize the doctor’s
subjective intent.74 This standard may protect Eli Lilly and Company, but it conflicts
with patent law principles.
C. Problems with the “Direction or Control” Standard
According to Akamai, it is consistent with The Patent Act to consider generally
whether all method steps can be attributed to a single entity rather than requiring a
traditional tort basis for liability. 75 Even though no contract or agency relationship
existed between Limelight and its customers, the court determined Limelight
directed or controlled them.76 Akamai’s standard for inducement clashes with the
concept of direct infringement set out in The Patent Act. 77 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) does
not describe any form of direct infringement that can be divided between two
actors.78 It follows that one entity should be liable for direct infringement of a
method only if it performs all of the steps itself or through another entity’s acts under

69 Id. (“We conclude that the facts Akamai presented at trial constitute substantial evidence
from which a jury could find that Limelight directed or controlled its customers’ performance of each
remaining method step.”).
70 Eli Lilly and Company v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., et. al., 1-10-cv-01376.
71 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 754; Manville Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 553; DSU
Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1304; Hewlett-Packard Co., 909 F.2d at 1469.
72 AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex Corp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (The court held
that that the patentees would be able to establish inducement because consumers following the
indications on the generic label would infringe the patented once-daily dosage method.); Aventis
Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Cobalt Pharm., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 586,599 (D. Mass. 2005)
(“Plaintiffs’ active inducement claim rests entirely on language in Cobalt’s proposed labeling
instructions and package insert.”). Wyeth stated that even when there is a non-infringing label, the
mere fact the drug is sold could be the basis for inducement. Wyeth v. Sandoz, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d
508, 521 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (“[E]ven if [Sandoz] successfully persuaded the finder of fact that the labels
[do] not instruct, direct, or encourage infringement . . . this would not be legally sufficient to
establish that the labels do not induce infringement.”)
73 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
74 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
75 Akamai Techs., Inc. 797 F.3d at 1025.
76 Id.
77 See infra notes 84-85.
78 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)(2014) states “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.” It does not mention a method divided among
multiple actors. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
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an established theory of liability.79 In fact, the Federal Circuit has required a
traditional agency relationship for multi-actor infringement in previous cases.80 A
divided infringement standard without these relationships results in a new type of
direct infringement, the creation of which should be left to the legislature. 81
The Akamai standard further clashes with the Patent Act by rendering the
concept of inducement unnecessary. 82 The Patent Act requires a finding of direct
infringement for a finding of inducement.83 The types of infringement that can be
divided between two actors, contributory infringement and inducement, both require
an initial finding of direct infringement.84 Both types of infringement have
additional requirements, such as the heightened mens rea necessary for
inducement.85 Inducement and contributory infringement cover the only situations
where behavior that amounts to less than direct infringement incurs liability. 86
The divided infringement standard creates another situation where behavior
less than direct infringement incurs liability.87 Divided infringement also doesn’t
require specific intent like inducement requires.88 It resembles inducement of
infringement, with looser requirements. 89 It allows acts to be divided between two
entities like inducement.90 However, it has less stringent requirements for the

79 See Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3389, *1, 2006 WL 151911 (E.D. Tex.
Jan. 19, 2006) (“proof of an agency relationship or concerted activity would be sufficient to impose
liability in circumstances where one party does not perform all of the steps of the claimed method.”).
See also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 282 (2003) (“When Congress creates a tort action, it legislates
against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules and consequently intends
its legislation to incorporate those rules.”).
80 New Jersey Patent Co., 159 F. at 173; Mobil Oil Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 252; Crowell, 143 F.2d
at 1004; Limelight Networks, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2111, 189 (2014) (“A method’s steps have not all been
performed as claimed by the patent unless they are all attributable to the same defendant.”).
81 BMC Res., Inc.., 498 F.3d at 1381. (“Expanding the rules governing direct infringement to
reach independent conduct of multiple actors would subvert the statutory scheme.”)
82 See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
83 Moba B.V., 325 F.3d at 1318; Dynacore Holdings Corp., 363 F.3d at 1277; Joy Techs. F.3d at
774; BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1379; Lucent Techs, 580 F.3d at 1322; Muniauction, 532 F.3d at
1328 (“The law of this circuit is axiomatic that a method claim is directly infringed only if each step
of the claimed method is performed.”).
84 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)(2014) (covering inducement of infringement and requiring that the one
party induce the other to infringe); 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (covering contributory infringement and
requiring a party to produce parts that can only be used for an infringing purpose). An initial
finding of direct infringement is necessary to find infringement under either of these sections. Moba
B.V., 325 F.3d at 1318; Dynacore Holdings Corp., 363 F.3d at 1277; Joy Techs. F.3d at 774; BMC
Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1379; Lucent Techs, 580 F.3d at 1322.
85 Manville Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 553 (“The alleged infringer must be shown, however, to
have knowingly induced infringement. It must be established that the defendant possessed specific
intent to encourage another’s infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the
acts alleged to constitute inducement.”).
86 See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
87 Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1023.
88 See generally Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1020.
89 Muniauction, Inc., 532 F.3d at 1381.
90 Id.
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relationship between the entities and the mental state. 91 Thus, it renders the
statutory causes of action for inducement unnecessary.92
An additional problem with the Akamai standard is how it clashes with an
important tenet of patent law. A well-known maxim in patent law is “that which
anticipates if before infringes if after.”93 If two separate entities perform steps of a
method sought to be patented, these entities’ actions can’t be grafted together to
anticipate a method patent.94 Yet under the Akamai standard, two entities’ actions
can be added together for a finding of infringement. 95 The lack of symmetry
demonstrates how divided infringement is at odds with the patent system. 96
Finally, Akamai’s general standard for direction or control allows courts to
define infringement after the fact. 97 The court can find liability anywhere between a
traditional agency relationship, and “some connection” between the parties, in order
to protect a patent.98 The doctor-patient relationship in Eli Lilly is not defined by the
respondeat superior theory.99 The patient isn’t obligated to follow the doctor’s
instructions, the patient hasn’t assumed liability for the doctor, and the patient
hasn’t agreed to carry out the doctor’s will. However, the court still found direction
or control after evaluating this relationship. 100 Without strict boundaries, companies
in Teva Parental Medicine’s position do not have clear notice of what conduct
constitutes infringement.
D. Divided Infringement and Mens Rea
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) states that whoever “actively induces” the infringement of a
patent is liable for inducement.101 Courts have interpreted 271(b) as requiring that
the inducer have knowledge that the patent is being infringed and that the inducer

91 Id. at 1381 (“[A] patentee would rarely, if ever, need to bring a claim for indirect
infringement.”).
92 Id.
93 Lewmar Marine, Inc.., 827 F.2d at 747.
Peters, 129 U.S. at 537; Door-Master Corp. v.
Yorktowne, Inc., 256 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
94 ATD Corp., 159 F.3d at 545 (“A patent is invalid for anticipation when the same device or
method, having all of the elements and limitations contained in the claims, is described in a single
prior art reference”).
95 Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1025; ATD Corp, 159 F.3d at 545.
96 See Oswald, supra note 21, at 61-63; Meyer, 537 U.S. at 282.
97 See Oswald, supra note 21, at 61-63. Professor Oswald discusses how divided infringement
was first defined as “something less than agency and more than a mere connection to determine
whether or not the accused party directs or controls a third-party supplier” and has never been
carefully defined. Id.
98 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
99 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 23. Respondeat Superior refers to a case where one actor is
liable for another actor’s tort and it attaches whether the actor has intent or not. Id. Agency is “the
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person
(an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control,
and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents to so act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 1.01 (2006).
100 Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1025.
101 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)(2014).
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specifically intends for the third party to infringe it. 102 Analyzing how generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers operate provides insight into whether intent to induce
divided infringement should be assumed from a label. Generic companies do not
have a patient-focused business model.103 Generally, they focus their business on
wholesalers at the top of a distribution chain. 104 The wholesalers then distribute
down the chain to a retail pharmacy. 105 On top of this, generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers do not focus on promoting individual drugs to patients, pharmacies, or
doctors.106 This adds another layer of separation between the generics manufacturer
and the doctor. These companies generally do not advertise products on television,
radio, or in print media.107 They also do not have sales representatives that visit
doctors or, sponsor medical symposia and other similar marketing activities. 108 In
fact, a generic company may not even pay attention to how its drug prescription is
used.109 Many times, generic companies do not even put the labels on the products
they sell.110
Another important factor is the doctor’s knowledge of the generic drugs. Generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ labels are rarely seen by any members of the
prescribing chain.111 Doctors do not typically look at the labels on the drugs. 112 They
simply assume the generic is a complete substitute for the original. 113 Given these
considerations, the instruction cannot prove intent on behalf of the drug company to
induce infringement divided between the doctor and the patient. The generic
company may not intend for one entity to infringe the patent, let alone for
102 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 563 U.S. at 754; Manville Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 553; DSU
Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1304; Hewlett-Packard Co., 909 F.2d at 1469.
103 See Upadhye, supra note 58, at 1359-1360.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 IMS Health Inc., 550 F.3d at 46 (“Detailing involves tailored one-on-one visits by
pharmaceutical sales representatives with physicians and their staffs. This is time-consuming and
expensive work, not suited to the marketing of lower-priced bioequivalent generic drugs. . . . Brand
name drug manufacturers . . . in the year 2000 spent roughly $4,000,000,000 on detailing.”).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See Upadhye, supra note 58, at 1365.
Mr. Upadhye provides insight into how generic
companies function: “While the patient and doctor may know that the intent of the drug prescription
is to treat a patented indication, the generic drug company does not and cannot know. In fact, it
might be callous (but true) to say that the generic drug company does not care how the patient uses
its drug.” Id.
110 Id. at 1365. (“A further problem is the practical reality that a generic company’s drug labels
are rarely seen by anyone in the prescribing chain. In the distribution of a generic product, multiple
bottles are packed into boxes with the labels (usually on a printed pad of paper) thrown in.”).
111 Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at 17-18, Wyeth Pharm., Inc. v. Food
& Drug Admin., Civ. A. No. 1:09-cv-01810-FJS (D.D.C. 2009), 2009 WL 3226432 (“Because
healthcare professionals assume that generic and branded drugs are completely interchangeable,
they generally do not scrutinize the generic drug and the branded drug for labeling differences.”);
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 12-13, Wyeth Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., No.
1:09-cv-01810-FJS (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2009), 2009 WL 3460818 (“Healthcare professionals justifiably
rely on the fact that the Hatch-Waxman Act requires generic drugs to be the same as their branded
counterparts in all material respects. . . . They have no reason to scrutinize the labeling for any
differences and, as a matter of clinical practice, rarely do so.”)
112 Id.
113 Id.
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infringement to be divided among two entities. Additionally, the doctor would be
held liable for controlling the patient even though the doctor is unaware of the
patent. Direct infringement is strict liability, but divided infringement may have
different requirements.114 These issues demonstrate that divided infringement
combined with inducement, can capture a broad spectrum of behaviors, some outside
what is covered by the Patent Act.115
E. Applying a More Stringent Standard
A more stringent standard, closer to the one in Muniauction, requires a finding
of direct infringement for a finding of inducement.116 It also requires that the finding
of direct infringement only extends to acts legally attributable to a single party. 117
Teva Parental Medicines is not liable under this standard. The patient is not the
agent of the doctor under a traditional tort theory of agency. 118 The patient is not
agreeing to represent the doctor or colluding with the doctor to infringe the patent.
This old standard comports with the statutory scheme and does not require
ends-driven policy-making on behalf of the courts. However, it leaves the patent
owner with no remedy. The Federal Circuit has articulated that an infringer should
not be allowed to circumvent a method patent by delegating performance of method
steps to another party.119 Under this standard, Eli Lilly & Company will struggle to
protect its patents. Even though it may struggle, the problem requires a different
solution than the departure from traditional agency standards.
IV. PROPOSAL
This section summarizes the issues presented by the Akamai divided
infringement standard; proposes possible solutions regarding claim drafting,
statutory interpretation, and statutory revision; and analyzes the effects of these
solutions on Eli Lilly.

114 Akamai Techs, Inc., 797 F.3d at 1022. All that is required is that an entity is responsible for
others’ performing of method steps if it directs or controls others’ performance or if the actors form a
joint enterprise. Id.
115 Limelight Networks, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2120 (arguing that a desire to avoid the consequences
of allowing multiple partners to carry out a method does not justify “fundamentally altering the
rules of inducement liability that the text and structure of the Patent Act clearly require” and
results in a “free-floating concept of “infringement” with no statutory basis that is difficult to apply
consistently); McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531,* 13 (Fed.Cir.
2011) (explaining that patent law is a “creature of statute,” and that greatly expanding indirect
infringement outside the bounds of infringement is inappropriate).
116 Muniauction, Inc., 532 F.3d at 1330 (“Thomson neither performed every step of the claimed
methods nor had another party perform steps on its behalf. . . . Therefore, Thomson does not
infringe the asserted claims as a matter of law.”).
117 Id.
118 Id.; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 23 (A party that “innocently and carefully does an act
which furthers the tortious purpose of another” is not acting in concert with them.”).
119 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381.
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A. Summary of the Issues
The Akamai standard for divided infringement contradicts a well-established
rule in patent law: that a finding of direct infringement is required for a finding of
indirect infringement.120 This new standard is at odds with the statutory definition
of inducement.121 It provides an ends-driven fix to multi-actor infringement that
protects method patents by bolstering their scope in court, but it clashes with the
patent system and The Patent Act.
B. Careful Claim Drafting
Unitary claim drafting can resolve the divided infringement problem before
litigation starts.122 The Federal Circuit has recognized that a patentee can draft a
claim so that only a single party can infringe it. 123 Unitary claim drafting prevents
the enforcement of poorly drafted patents and does not widen a patent’s scope after
infringement.124
Mr. Lemley, in his article titled “Divided Infringement Claims,” provides
strategies for unitary claim drafting. 125 A drafter can focus a method claim on one
entity by using “receiving” language when another entity supplies a claim element. 126
Mr. Lemley includes an example involving a method of communication between
browsers and websites.127 If drafted correctly, the claim can capture only the server’s
actions by using receiving language when referring to the third party. 128 The claim
can be written from other perspectives as well. 129 For example, the drafter could

120 Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eons Labs. Mfg., Inc., 363 F.3d 1306, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972); Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
Convertible Top Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961).
121 Joy Techs., Inc. 6 F.3d at 774 (“To hold that the sale of equipment which performs a patented
process is itself a direct infringement would make that portion of § 271(c) relating to the sale of an
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process meaningless.”); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Under such an approach, the need for
contributory infringement and inducement, as Congress envisioned, is essentially eviscerated.”).
122 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Many
amici have pointed out that the claim drafter is the least cost avoider of the problem of
unenforceable patents due to joint infringement.”).
123 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381 (“The concerns over a party avoiding infringement by
arms-length cooperation can usually be offset by proper claim drafting. A patentee can usually
structure a claim to capture infringement by a single party.”); see Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided
Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272-75 (2005); see Oswald, supra note 21, at 65-66; see
generally W. Keith Robinson, Ramifications of Joint Infringement Theory on Emerging Technology
Patents, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 363-69 (2010).
124 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381; see Lemley, supra note 123, at 272-75.
125 See Lemley, supra note 123, at 272-75 (“Most inventions . . . can be covered using claims
drafted in unitary form.”).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. For example instead of “Transmitting a request to a server,” a step performed by the
customer, Mr. Lemley suggests constructing the claim as “Receiving a request from a client”. Id.
This way the server is the only entity that performs the steps. Id.
129 See Lemley, supra note 123, at 272-75.
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draft the claim from the perspective of a third party inducing another to perform the
method patent.130
This strategy is effective in both the Eli Lilly and the Akamai cases. Like
Mr. Lemley’s example, Akamai also involves server technology.
Akamai
Technologies could have used this receiver-focused language when referring to the
actions of the third-party users that perform the tagging step. 131

Original Claim

“tagging at least some of the embedded objects of the
page so that requests for the objects resolve to the
domain instead of the content provider domain”132

Receiver-Focused
Claim

“Receiving a client request for objects that were
tagged to resolve to the domain instead of the content
provider domain”

Eli Lilly & Company could also have employed this strategy. Instead of method
claims directing the patient to take the pemetrexed disodium, the claims could be
written from the perspective of the doctor.133:
Original Claim
Doctor-Focused
Claim

“administration of pemetrexed disodium.”134
“Instructing the patient to administer pemetrexed
disodium.”

Opponents of this solution argue that unitary claim drafting results in confusing
and indefinite claims.135 Patent law requires that inventions must be claimed clearly

130 Id. (“In particular, a complementary version of the unitary claim should be drafted in an
attempt to cover client-side acts performed in cooperation with such an offshore server.”) Id.
Employing this strategy, the drafter could frame the steps in terms of transmitting the request to
the off-shore server, sending the appropriate data the server, and then receiving information back
from the server. Id.
131 Akamai Techs, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d at 96-97. Akamai owns a number of storage servers
around the country. Id. The content provider can modify its URLs so that the end users are
redirected to Akamai’s servers when they visit the original content provider’s site. Id. Akamai’s
patent allowed customers to “tag” their web pages to be redirected to the nearest server. Id.
132 Akamai Techs, Inc., 692 F.3d at 1334.
133 Eli Lilly and Company v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., et. al., 1-10-cv-01376 (INSD). As
discussed in the analysis, Eli Lilly & Company’s method steps were substantially performed by a
doctor, but the doctor had to instruct the patient to obtain and administer the premetrexed
disodium. Id.
134 Id.
135 Michelle Lee & Michael Shuster, Threading the Needle Between Divided Infringement Issues
and
Patentable
Subject
Matter
(2012)
available
at
https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/threading-the-needle-between-divided-infringementissues-and-patentable-subject-matter.aspx (“Method claims drafted to avoid divided infringement,
for example, by claiming only the data analysis and not the data collection steps, can give rise to
patentability issues under the patent law’s eligible subject matter statute.”)
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and concisely to provide public notice. 136 Another opposing viewpoint is that it may
always be possible to divide the performance of method steps between multiple
entities.137 This solution may not capture all cases, but it has been recognized by
academics and the Federal Circuit as feasible. It also captures the behavior in the
Akamai and Eli Lilly cases.138
C. Proper Statutory Interpretation
The problems surrounding divided infringement and inducement can also be
solved by proper interpretation of the Patent Act. One actor should only be liable for
another’s activity through a traditionally recognized agency standard. 139 An agency
standard does not encompass mere arms-length cooperation, the vendor-customer
relationship in Akamai, or the doctor-patient relationship in Eli Lilly.140 There are
several actors in Eli Lilly: the patient who has to take the drug; the doctor who has to
prescribe it; the pharmacy that has to fill it; the wholesaler that provided the drug to
the pharmacy; and the generic drug company that made it and sold it to the
wholesaler.141
In all of these relationships, there is no master-servant or
principal-agent relationship. The Federal Circuit has indicated that it doesn’t want
parties to shirk liability though cooperation that does not amount to an agency
relationship.142 However, judicially creating a new form of infringement without a
sufficient basis for liability is not the proper solution.
The Patent Act also requires a finding of intent as a predicate to inducement. 143
The infringer must knowingly induce infringement.144 The case law strongly

136 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2014); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 112 (8th ed. 2008); Muniauction Petition for en banc
Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellee, 2008 WL 3833922 (C. A. Fed.).
137 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that a
method claim is necessarily formed of individual steps, or elements, and implies that each step
occurs in isolation).
138 See Lemley, supra note 123, at 272-75; BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381.
139 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 23, § 69. Agency, or vicarious liability, requires one actor
assume liability for another’s actor tortious conduct due to “some relation existing” between them,
traditionally an employer-employee relationship. Id. This sort of liability originated from employer
being imputed with liability for losses caused by torts of employees, a surety of doing business and
owning employees. Id.
140 HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP
1-3 (2d ed. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 1 (1958) (explaining the agency relationship
results when one individual consents to allow the other to act on her behalf); Carr v. Runyan, 89
F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that “actual authority exists where the principal has in fact
authorized the agent to [act] . . . on behalf of the principal.”). In general, the purpose behind agency
principles “is to enable a person, through the services of another, to broaden the scope of his
activities and receive the product of another’s efforts, paying such other for what he does but
retaining for himself any net benefit resulting from the work performed.”
HAROLD GILL
REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 1-3 (2d ed. 1990).
141 See Upadhye, supra note 58, at 1365.
142 BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381.
143 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2014).
144 Manville Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 553. (“The alleged infringer must be shown, however, to
have knowingly induced infringement.”)
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suggests inducement requires specific intent. 145 The mere existence of a label does
not necessarily indicate specific intent. 146 A generic company shouldn’t be held liable
because its product was labeled by another entity and then transported to the
infringer through the stream of commerce.147 If stream of commerce is not sufficient
for jurisdiction, it should not prove specific intent. 148 If Teva Parental Medicines did
not have specific intent, it has not committed the tort laid out by the drafters of the
Patent Act.149
It may seem unfair to allow parties to escape liability merely because they have
divvied up the steps of the claims without creating a certain relationship. However,
judicially eliminating important concepts of patent law is not the proper solution.
D. Statutory Revision
Statutory revision provides a solution to multiple actor infringement scenarios
and allows Congress, rather than the courts, to alter the patent law. 150
One possible revision is removing direct infringement as a predicate to
inducement.151 The inducement section could be re-written to encompass situations
where one party induces two others to jointly infringe a method patent. 152 Under this
proposed standard, a party is liable for inducement as long as they have the specific
intent to induce other parties to infringe.153 The Eli Lilly defendants, if they
demonstrated the specific intent, could incur liability under this standard. This
alteration prevents the creation of a new, confusing notion of divided infringement,
which is at odds with the concept of indirect infringement. 154 It would acknowledge
that two parties can be induced by one actor to infringe, without themselves being
directly liable. This revision would alter a fundamental tenet of patent law, and is a
145 Hewlett-Packard Co., 909 F.2d at 1469 (stating that “proof of actual intent to cause the acts
which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.”);
Manville Sales Corp, 917 F.2d at 553 (“It must be established that the defendant possessed specific
intent to encourage another’s infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the
acts alleged to constitute inducement.”).
146 See Upadhye, supra note 58, at 1359-1360.
147 Id. at 1364; Eli Lilly and Company v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., et. al., 1-10-cv-01376
(INSD); see generally Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
148 For a discussion on stream of commerce, see J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780, 2784 (2011). If “specific intent” by stream of commerce was enough for inducement, there
would be negative implications for other areas of law that utilized specific intent—such as criminal
law. Hammer manufacturers, rope makers, and drill makers would be liable for bank robberies,
rapes, and safe cracking. Email interview with Shashank Uphadye, Partner at Amin Talati &
Upadhye (Nov. 11 2015).
149 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
150 See Oswald, supra note 21, at 5 (“multiactor patent infringement doctrine that is not
grounded in either precedent or statutory language suggests that the court is infringing on the
congressional realm of creating patent policy”).
151 Id. at 66. In her dissent, Judge Newman argued that “a broad, all-purpose single-entity
requirement is flawed, and restores infringement to its status as occurring when all of the claimed
steps are performed, whether by a single entity or more than one entity.” Akamai Techs, Inc., 692
F.3d at 1319.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Joy Techs., Inc. 6 F.3d at 774; Akamai Techs, Inc., 692 F.3d at 1350.

[15:780 2016] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

798

large revision for a narrow problem. However, it is better to put in the hands of the
legislature, than the Federal Circuit.155
Congress could also create divided infringement as a subset of direct
infringement.156 The tort of divided infringement between two actors could be added,
and the law could specifically address which types of relationships qualify as divided
infringement.157 It could address whether strict direction and control is required, or
whether a mere arms-length relationship is sufficient. The statute could also include
traditional common law notions of liability, including joint-tortfeasorship or an
agency standard.158 This is a substantial alteration implemented to solve a narrow
problem.159 However, the policy makers are best equipped to make this decision.
Including it in the statute provides clear notice of what is protected: an important
policy of patent law.160
V. CONCLUSION
A combination of proper statutory interpretation and unitary claim drafting is
an effective response to the divided infringement problem. After implementing these
new standards, some cases may still slip through the cracks, leaving certain
plaintiffs without a remedy. If this becomes a problem, a statutory revision is the
best solution to the problems presented by the divided infringement standard.

Akamai Techs, Inc., 692 F.3d at 1314; Cordis Corp., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1023. This is the standard that the Federal Circuit
implemented in Akamai. Id.
157 Id. For example, Akamai held that “liability under § 271(a) can also be found when an
alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a
step or steps of a patented method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance.” Id.
The legislature could include this as a situation that incurs liability. Id.
158 Id. The Federal Circuit has discussed agency, joint tortfeasorship, the direction or control
standard, and an aiding and abetting standard. Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1023-25.
159 See Oswald, supra note 21, at 66. For the precedent regarding these concepts see Novartis
Pharm. Corp., Inc., 363 F.3d at 1308; Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 526; Aro Mfg. Co., 365 U.S.
at 341; Joy Techs., 6 F.3d at 774; Akamai Techs, Inc., 692 F.3d at 1333-36.
160 Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. 145 F.3d 1472, 1474-77, (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Public
notice of the scope of the right to exclude, as provided by the patent claims, specification, and
prosecution history, is a critical function of the entire scheme of patent law”).
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